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percent." Unlike the rulings on the right to counsel," search and sei-
zure,"' or coerced confession, 2 for example, which affected most crimi-
nal defendants, the Apodaca decision will directly touch only one of
every one or two hundred defendants. Its psychic impact on the Ameri-
can system of justice may be more difficult to measure.
THOMAS A. LEMLY
Environmental Law-Substantive Judicial Review Under The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)' sets
forth a declaration of national environmental policy (section 101)2 and
establishes procedural requirements for governmental agencies when-
ever a major Federal activity which will have a major impact on the
environment is undertaken (section 102). 3 These procedural require-
ments include the compilation of information and submission of an
environmental impact statement to the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity before any work on a major federal project is begun. Section 102
"Id. at 17-18.
c°Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
81Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
'42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
242 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970):
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the inter-
relations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influ-
ences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the
critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall
welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal
Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned
public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including
financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;
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has consistently been held to be a ground on which to base judicial
review of an administrative agency's action.' Environmentalists have
been quick to utilize the courts to enforce as stringently as possible the
procedural requirements of NEPA in cases involving agency actions
which have ranged from nuclear warhead tests5 to the attempted aban-
donment of a railroad line.' As a result of this active social concern on
the part of groups and individuals, most agencies have realized that
compliance with section 102 is necessary. However, many agencies now
seem to be reluctantly seeking to comply with the letter, but not the
spirit of NEPA. In these cases environmentalists have turned to section
101 in their efforts to enforce the policy of NEPA. This note will deal
with the controversy over judicial review of administrative actions under
section 101,7 specifically focusing on the case of Conservation Council
of North Carolina v. Froehlke.
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports
diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will per-
mit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enchance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maxi-
mum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environ-
ment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and
enhancement of the environment.
342 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
4See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C.
1971), aftd, 3 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1558 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 1972).
5Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
7For a clear recognition of the distinctions between procedural and substantive judicial review
see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). There the court stated
that an agency's action is to be set aside if it fails to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional
requirements (procedural review), or if the action was not supported by "substantial evidence" or
was "unwarranted by the facts" (substantive review). The latter involves a "searching and careful"
inquiry into the facts, but the court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Id. at 414, 416. In addition, see Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive
Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & CoMt. L. Riv.
685 (1972).
$340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C.), affd mem., 4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1044 (4th Cir. May 2, 1972).
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On December 30, 1963, Congress authorized a "project for the
comprehensive development of the Cape Fear River Basin," 9 North
Carolina's largest river basin. This development, designated New Hope
Lake, was to be created by an earthen dam to be built upstream from
the point where the Deep River and the Haw River join to form the
Cape Fear River. The lake to be formed by the dam would cover a total
of 14,300 acres. 0 The land within this projected pool is primarily wood-
land and farms. The woodland is made up of hardwoods mixed with
pine, and the chief crops produced are corn, cotton, tobacco, and pas-
ture grasses."'
The purposes of the dam include flood control, water supply, water
quality control, general recreation, and fish and wildlife enhancement.
The original cost of the New Hope project was to be 44.5 million dollars
but was later revised to fifty-three million dollars. Ground breaking
occurred on December 7, 1970, and as of September, 1971, fifty-four
percent of the land had been acquired and twenty-two percent of the
work completed with total cost as of that date of 16.9 million dollars.'"
On August 10, 1971, the Conservation Council of North Carolina
brought an action in United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of North Carolina seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against
the construction of the New Hope Dam by the United States Army
Corps of Engineers. This action, Conservation Council of North Caro-
lina v. Froehlke,13 came before Chief Judge Eugene A. Gordon who on
February 14, 1972, issued a memorandum order denying plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction.'
The heart of the New Hope case involved the court's denial of
substantive review under section 101.I1 NEPA, in the opinion of the
9Act of Dec. 30, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-253, 77 Stat. 841.
1 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE NEW
HOPE LAKE, NORTH CAROLINA PROJECT 1 (1970).
"Id. at 6.
"Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222, 224 (M.D.N.C.),
affd mer., 4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1044 (4th Cir. May 2, 1972).
"Id.
"Id. at 228.
"Specifically, plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that:
(I) the defendants had given insufficient consideration to alternatives to the project in that
the environmental impact statement merely listed certain alternatives without sufficiently discuss-
ing them;
(2) the environmental impact statement failed to meet the requirements of section 102(2)(c)
because it omitted consideration of two future nuclear power plants to be constructed downstream
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court, does not provide such review, but only establishes procedures with
which government agencies must comply: "[T]hese requirements pro-
vide only procedural remedies instead of substantive rights, and the
function of the court is to insure that the requirements are met. '"'6 Tile
court relied on several cases in support of its conclusion that the judici-
ary is powerless to substitute its own opinion as to whether or not a
project should be undertaken.
Probably the clearest support for the court's decision in Froehlke
is found in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers.7 There
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the damming of the Cossatot River in
Arkansas by the Corps of Engineers, basing their action on both section
101 and section 102 of NEPA. The court refused the injunction and
expressly denied the existence of substantive review under section 101:
[NEPA] appears to reflect a compromise which, in the opinion of
the Court, falls short of creating the type of "substantive rights"
claimed by the plaintiffs. . . . If the Congress had intended to leave
it to the courts to determine such matters [prohibition of the dam]; if,
indeed, it had intended to give up its own prerogative and those of the
executive agencies in this respect, it certainly would have used explicit
language to accomplish such a far-reaching objective'
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin'9 plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the Secretary of Agriculture from undertaking a cooperative
federal-state program to control the fire ant population in the southeast-
ern United States by spraying insecticides. Plaintiffs based their action
on allegations that the defendant failed to satisfy the substantive and
procedural requirements of NEPA. In denying the preliminary injunc-
tion the court limited its review to the procedural aspects of NEPA,
saying: "Thus in reviewing the Department of Agriculture program
under consideration here, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
from the dam and the effect of a proposed extension of Interstate Highway 40 which will transect
one of the wildlife sub-impoundments planned for the project;
(3) the ratio of the costs of the project to its benefits had been exaggerated in the following
areas: interest rate and project life, nutrient removal costs, flood control benefits, water quality
benefits, water supply and recreational benefits.
See Brief for Plaintiffs, Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222
(M.D.N.C. 1972).
"1340 F. Supp. at 225.
1325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
1Id. at 755.
"325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
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that of the Secretary on the merits of the proposed program but will
require that the Secretary comply with the procedural requirements of
[NEPA]." 0
Froehlke also held that the purpose of judicial review under NEPA
is to insure that the procedural requirements are met, that is, that the
environmental impact statement is complete, thus allowing Congress
and the President to consider the evidence presented and decide on the
desirability and feasibility of the project.
It is clear that NEPA was not intended to be a means for the
Courts to second guess congressional appropriations, but was intended
to be a means of disclosing to Congress and other decisionmakers all
environmental factors in order that decisions and appropriations could
be made with as little adverse effect on the environment as possible.21
The immediate result of the Froehlke decision was denial of the
plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. This order was affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.22 At
present the case is before Judge Gordon on cross-motions for summary
judgment.
The principle in Froehlke has been followed in at least two cases:
Pizitz v. Volpe 23 and Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers.24 In the latter case plaintiffs challenged construction of
Alabama's Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, basing some of their
allegations on section 101 in much the same manner as the plaintiffs in
211d. at 1404.
2340 F. Supp. at 228. Support for this is found in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v.
Seaborg, 3 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1971). There the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit refused to enjoin, under NEPA, nuclear tests on Amchitka Island,
saying the court's "function is only to assure that the statement sets forth the opposing scientific
views, and does not take the arbitrary and impermissible approach of completely omitting ...
any responsible scientific opinions concerning possible adverse environmental effects." Id. at 1128-
29. Other cases concurring in the basic holding include: Bradford Township v. Highway Authority,
4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1301 (7th Cir. June 22, 1972); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir.
1971) (limited to cases involving national security); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d
650 (10th Cir. 1971). The latter case presents an interesting quirk in that the provisions of NEPA
are invoked, not by an environmental group but by several large oil companies, to prevent the
federal government from discontinuing the purchase of helium from them. In the district court's
words, it was "passing strange" to see the giants of the oil and gas industry representing the public
interest. Id. at 654.
24 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1044 (4th Cir. May 2, 1972) (mem.).
2'4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1195 (M.D. Ala. May 1, 1972).
24 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1408 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 4, 1972).
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Froehlke. The Mississippi court cited Froehlke in support of its holding
that:
Courts do not sit to decide the substantive merits or demerits of
a federal undertaking under NEPA, but only to make certain that the
responsible federal agency, in this case the Corps of Engineers, makes
full disclosure of environmental consequences to the decisionmakers.
While the exact scope of § 101 has not been defined by the Supreme
Court, the prevailing view of the federal courts is that neither this
section nor other provisions of NEPA create substantive rights that are
enforceable in the courts.?'
Notwithstanding these decisions, several courts have engaged in
substantive judicial review under section 101 and to that extent are in
disagreement with the ruling of the Froehlke court. In one such case,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded
that "reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision
on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual
balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly
gave insufficient weight to environmental values.' 2
Furthermore, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed-
eral Power Commission,27 one of the two 28 most recent recent develop-
ments in the litigation over Consolidated Edison's plan to construct a
pumped storage hydro-electric project at Storm King Mountain on the
Hudson River, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit construed
section 101 as requiring the detailed and exhaustive consideration of
environmental factors required by that court when it remanded the same
case to the Federal Power Commission five years prior.29 These require-
ments included detailed substantive review by the court of alternate
plans to the project and of the project's impact on "the conservation of
natural resources, the maintenance of natural beauty, and the preserva-
'Id. at 1413.
2 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, I115
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
'453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 2453 (1972).
'The other being deRham v. Diamond, 69 Misc. 2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1972), a
case not involving NEPA but a clear example of substantive judicial review in that the New York
Supreme Court held that the New York Commissioner of Environmental Conservation acted "in
excess of his authority and in violation of law" in certifying that the Storm King project complied
with state water quality standards. Id. at _., 330 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
z'Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
[Vol. 51
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tion of historic sites."30 The court said that "the policy statement in
Section 101 envisions the very type of full consideration and balancing
of various factors which we, by our remand order, required the Commis-
sion to undertake."
31
Similarly, in National Resources Defense Council v. Morton32 an
injunction was granted banning the sale of oil and gas leases on the outer
continental shelf off eastern Louisiana. The court reviewed the sub-
stance of the environmental impact statement and found that "the de-
fendants only superficially discussed the alternatives listed in the Final
Impact Statement, and they failed to discuss in detail the environmental
impacts of the alternatives they listed in the statement. ' ':13
In Hanly v. Mitchell34 the Second Circuit again recognized
NEPA's substantive review provision. The General Services Adminis-
tration (GSA) was required to submit an environmental impact state-
ment covering the proposed construction of a federal jail in a neighbor-
hood of New York City containing several government buildings and
two apartment complexes which housed fifty thousand people. The
court found the GSA's action "arbitrary and capricious ' '3 5 in not con-
sidering all relevant factors in making its determination that an environ-
mental impact statement was not necessary. The statement should
include a "hard look at the particular environmental impact of squeez-
ing a jail into a narrow area directly across the street from two large
apartment houses."13' The court issued a preliminary injunction and
remanded the case to GSA for a "proper determination, . . . taking
account of all relevant factors, of whether the proposed jail significantly
affects the quality of the human environment. ' 37
In Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United
States38 the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the Interstate
'Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463, 469 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 2453 (1972).
3
'Id. at 481.
323 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1558 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 1972).
331d. at 1560.
314 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1152 (2d Cir. May 17, 1972). This case originally involved only proce-
dural review under section 102(2)(c) since GSA contended that an impact statement was not
necessary. However a short impact statement was ultimately submitted. The court discussed the
procedural aspects in ruling that an impact statement was required and discussed the substantive





4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1312 (D.D.C. July 10, 1972), stay denied sub nom. Aberdeen R.R. v.
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Commerce Commission, which had ordered a 2.5 percent surcharge to
the normal tariff on all rail freight. The challenge was based on the
theory that this surcharge increased the cost of shipping recyclable ma-
terials, thus discouraging the environmentally desirable use of recycla-
ble goods to the extent that an environmental impact statement was
required under NEPA. The ICC had stated that the environmental
impact of this surcharge was "unclear. ' 39 Its statement had also exam-
ined alternatives to the increase "in extremely cursory fashion."4 The
court agreed with the plaintiffs that improper consideration was given
to the environmental impact and issued relief.
There is obviously a great difference of opinion over the availability
of review under section 101. Several courts have engaged in substantive
review under NEPA, but none have specifically and comprehensively
discussed it in their opinions. However, a closer look at the facts of the
New Hope case reveal that it was an ideal vehicle for such an undertak-
ing.
It has been decided that in reviewing an agency action under
NEPA, the reviewing court cannot substitute its own judgment for that
of the agency. 4 However, the court can reverse a substantive agency
decision which has been based on an arbitrary balance of costs and
benefits or insufficient consideration of environmental factors. 2 The
facts of the New Hope case presented a clear case for finding an arbi-
trary cost-benefit balance and a lack of consideration of environmental
factors.
Three areas will be considered here to show that the cost-benefit
ratio was improper and therefore, should have been subject to judicial
review. The first factor to be considered is the cost of nutrient removal.
The environmental impact statement submitted by the Corps of Engi-
neers expressed concern over nutrient enrichment of the lake and possi-
ble algae blooms which may occur.43 Yet the analysis of the project by
the Corps of Engineers included no costs for the necessary removal of




"Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
42 d.
41 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 10, at 21-22.
[Vol. 51
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these nutrients.44 Thus the entire cost of the project had not been shown.
Secondly, in determining the amount of benefit from flood control,
the Corps of Engineers determined flood frequency by using flood data
for the region in which the project is located.45 The method of calculat-
ing flood frequency used here by the Corps of Engineers" requires that
local data be used if available; otherwise regional data is acceptable. 47
Local data was available in this case4" but was not used. Plaintiffs'
expert witness, Dr. Edward H. Wiser, in his deposition, stated that use
of local rather than regional data would reduce the estimate of flood
control benefits from 2,094,000 dollars (as estimated by the Corps of
Engineers) to 938,800 dollars annually" and cause a corresponding drop
in the cost-benefit ratio.
A final consideration is the potential recreational benefits of the
project. In determining the dollar value of recreational benefits, the
environmental impact statement used an admission price of fifty-five
cents per person and placed the average number of man-days of recrea-
tion per year at 2,760,000.10 This latter figure is probably derived from
an estimation of the total possible number of man-hours of recreation
that the lake could provide." It is very unlikely that the lake will be filled
to recreational capacity every day of its existence.
Froehlke not only failed to utilize the opportunity to interpret
NEPA as allowing substantive judicial review but virtually emasculated
NEPA, leaving only the shell of the statute which was designed to
establish and enforce a national environmental policy. For example,
Froehlke held that the project in question need not be more environmen-
tally desirable than those alternatives to the project which are required
to be listed in the environmental impact statement .5 After Froehlke the
"See id.
"Id. at 81.
"The log-Pearson Type III Method. For a discussion of this calculation see 3 id. at 321-64.
"Id. at 343.
"Id. The preliminary impact statements included no mention of local data. There the flood
control frequency was based on regional data. However, Dr. Wiser's deposition, in which the local
data was discussed, was included in the final impact statement even though the determination of
flood frequency was not changed to reflect the local data.
"Id. at 341-42.
'I Id. at 18, 28.
"The Corps of Engineers gave no explanation of the source of this figure. However, plaintiffs
understood it to be based on this estimation. Interview with Thomas Schoenbaum, counsel for
plaintiffs, in Chapel Hill, N.C., Aug. 1, 1972.
"1340 F. Supp. at 228.
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reviewing court would be powerless to act where the agency had gone
through the formality of listing the alternatives, thus complying with the
procedural requirements of section 102(2)(c). This leaves NEPA with
no muscle to halt an undesirable project after the agency has "filled in
the blanks" by simply listing the alternatives.
Finally, the facts of Froehlke indicate that the inadequacies and
inaccuracies of the environmental impact statement were so great as to
constitute a breach of the procedural as well as the substantive require-
ments of NEPA. The court did not insist upon the detailed considera-
tion of the project that is required by NEPA. Instead it accepted the
self-serving description of the project presented by the Corps of Engi-
neers which casually dismissed many of New Hope's costs and adverse
effects while relying on exaggerated benefits. The inadequate considera-
tion of the alternatives to the project also amounted to noncompliance
with section 102. Section 102 implicitly requires that the reports of
alternatives be complete and accurate. NEPA does not contemplate the
submission of misleading reports. When inaccurate reports are submit-
ted the agency has not even met the procedural requirements of NEPA.
This case could have become the cornerstone of substantive judicial
review under NEPA without breaching the traditional limits on judicial
power. Without doubt, substantive judicial review conjures up visions
of the court completely disregarding a reasonable and well-supported
administrative decision by substituting its own subjective beliefs and
preferences. Agencies on occasion fail to fully consider the
environmental impact of their programs and projects. Section 101
should be interpreted as providing a judicial solution to such situations
without unduly restricting agency discretion.
STEPHEN T. SMITH
Income Taxation-Deductibility of Employment Agency Fees
Within the last few years executive level employees have been seek-
ing new employment as frequently as blue-collar workers.' In a highly
specialized technological or administrative field, employment opportun-
ities are rare, and it is frequently necessary for the job seeker to engage
'Tucker, An Individual's Employment-Seeking Expenses: Analyzing the New Judicial
Climate, 34 J. TAx. 352 (1971).
[Vol. 5 1
